

R 060914Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO JOINT STAFF WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCCENT INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
INFO AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
AMEMBASSY ASTANA
AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
SECSTATE WASHDC 1033
DIA WASHDC 0085
DEA HQ WASHINGTON DC
HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001269

CENTCOM FOR CCJ5, SOCCENT FOR J33, DIA FOR DHO-2, STATE FOR SCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2018

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [MAS](#) [OVIP](#) [PREL](#) [TI](#)

SUBJECT: EMBASSY DUSHANBE REQUEST FOR FY09

USCENTCOM/SOCCENT COUNTER NARCO TERRORISM TRAINING EVENTS

REF: A. SECDEF-APPROVED FY2009 GLOBAL FORCE MANAGEMENT
ALLOCATION PLAN (GFMAP)/CJCS/151900Z MAY
2008

[1](#)B. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (CJCS)
INSTRUCTIONS 3710.01/28MAY93 FOR
DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FOR APPROVING
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT TO DRUG AND/OR LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AND COUNTER-DRUG
RELATED DEPLOYMENT OF US DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE (DOD) PERSONNEL

[1](#)C. 08 DUSHANBE 1131 (DTG 101115Z SEP 08)

[1](#)D. 08 STATE 105455 (DTG 021659Z OCT 08)

Classified By: Tracey Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Dushanbe, STATE;
REASON: 1.4 (a) and (d)

[1](#)1. (C) Summary. In accordance with REFs A and B, this message is an Embassy Dushanbe request for FY09 DOD operational support under 1004, National Defense Authorization Act 1991, as amended for development of Counter Narco Terrorism (CNT) training deployments with the National Guard Special Forces (SF) Battalion, the Border Guard SF Battalion/Separate Group for Special Reconnaissance, and the Ministry of Interior Special Purpose Police Squad (OMON). Post requests four CNT events for FY 2009, as sourced in the past two years.

[1](#)2. (U) U.S. agency requesting CNT events. This request has been approved by the Ambassador, Embassy Dushanbe, and is made through the Embassy Dushanbe, Acting Drug Enforcement Agency Country Officer (DEA CO), Mr. Paul Hackett.

[1](#)3. (C) Partner Nation (PN) organizations requesting these events. GEN-MAJ Rajabali Rahmonali, Commander of the Tajik National Guard, GEN-MAJ Sherali Mirzo, Commander of the Border Guards, and Tajik Interior Minister Solehov have requested that their SF battalions/OMON receive the proposed training.

Justification for the CNT Training

[1](#)4. (C) Narcotics, ultimately destined for the U.S. and other international markets are transshipped from Afghanistan through Tajikistan. Embassy Dushanbe reporting concerning transit/trafficking activity in Central and South Asia indicates that past and current levels of narcotics trafficking activity in Tajikistan are significant and are likely to increase in conjunction with this year's poppy harvest in Afghanistan. Due to persistent security incidents and the lack of coordinated efforts, as of July 2008, the

poppy eradication campaign in Afghanistan was relatively ineffective, and cultivation levels for the year are expected to increase. The funds generated from the sale of narcotics are used to support terrorist activity and organized crime, and the trafficking of drugs through Tajikistan fosters corruption, violent crime, AIDS, and economic distortions, all of which are destabilizing factors in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility.

¶15. (C) The Tajik National Guard and Border Guards Special Forces battalions, and the Ministry of Interior OMON detachment, among other agencies, are the primary Counter Narco Terrorist (CNT) special operations capable forces in Tajikistan. The continuation of the CENTCOM, SOCCENT, and QEmbassy Dushanbe CNT training program, as part of the overall Foreign Internal Defense (FID) strategy and program for Tajikistan, would expand and increase the development of a strong combined and unified U.S./Tajik effort in disrupting the escalation of illegal narcotics smuggled through Central Asia and in denying insurgents and terrorists access to a critical funding source for continued terrorist and insurgent operations in Tajikistan and the region.

¶16. (C) A tactical CNT program promotes greater regional stability, decreases the amount of illegal narcotics transiting through Tajikistan and Central Asia to international markets in the Russia, Europe and the United States and is an indirect approach for defeating international terrorism and insurgents that threaten the stability of Tajikistan and the region. In the post 9/11 environment, a Tajik CNT capability has become more critical in combating terrorist/narcotic activity and supports USCENTCOM theater objectives for security cooperation and both CENTCOM,s and the U.S. Special Operations Command,s (USSOCCOM) regional and global war on terrorism.

¶17. (C) Critical training tasks that the Tajik National Guard, Border Guards, and OMON squads have requested include the following: staff organization and planning, orders production, mission analysis and the military decision making process, intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), direct action (raids and ambushes), special reconnaissance, close quarters combat/battle (CQC/B), sniper/observe operations, military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED), Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE), tactical communications and basic combat life saving.

¶18. (C) Embassy Dushanbe requests that pre-deployment site surveys (PDSS) and/or assessments be scheduled for all events. The National Guard and Border Guard SF Battalions and the MOI OMON have requested detailed training schedules and programs of instruction (POI) be provided following each PDSS. Training will be conducted at the Fakhrrabad, Lahur, and Karatag training areas in Tajikistan. Other training locations within Tajikistan may be designated by the host nation.

Rules of Engagement

¶10. (C) CJCS standing Rules of Engagement (ROE) are in effect. Deploying forces will not under any circumstances accompany U.S. DEA or PN counter-parts on actual CNT field operations or participate in any activity in which hostilities are imminent. Embassy Dushanbe Country Team further understands that units and individuals deployed outside the United States, its territories and possessions will deploy with assigned weapons and ammunition, whenever possible. When carrying weapons is not required in country, the weapons will be stored in a secure location which provides reasonable access. Any change in carry condition will be coordinated with the RSO. Diplomatic plated vehicles will be used for transport of all weapons to and from training locations.

¶11. (C) Justification. US SOF units and individuals must be capable of providing their own force protection when forward

deployed in all threat environments. Embassy Dushanbe Regional Security Officer (RSO), Mr. Seth Green, is the coordinating official for all weapons, ammunition and other sensitive items issues. Mr. Green can be contacted at the Embassy Dushanbe at comm: 992 37 229 2901 or 992 90 700 0911 or by unclass email at greense@state.gov or class email at greense@state.sgov.gov.

Human Rights Verification

¶12. REFTEL C is Embassy Dushanbe,s Leahy Human Rights Vetting Requests for the National Guard and Border Guards SF QVetting Requests for the National Guard and Border Guards SF Battalions and for the MOI,s OMON. REFTEL D is the response to this request, stating that the Department of State possesses no credible information of gross violations of human rights by the identified units and commanders.

Points of Contact for Training

¶13. Defense and Army Attache, Embassy Dushanbe, LTC Daniel R. Green is responsible for assisting the CNT team with issues while they are in Tajikistan. DEA Dushanbe Country Officer, Acting Country Attache Paul Hackett will be kept informed of any issues should they arise.

¶14. (U) Any questions concerning this message or CNT training should be directed to the Defense Attache, LTC Daniel Green, at 992-37-229-2701 or 992-90-700-7030 or the DEA Acting Country Attache, Paul Hackett, at 992 37 224 2807 or 992 90 700 7095.

JACOBSON